illustration of the government's progress towards stagnation. The
1897 tariff revision "could not," says Professor Skelton, "have been
bettered as a first preliminary step toward free trade."
"Unfortunately," he adds, "it proved to be the last step save for
the 1911 attempt to secure reciprocity." After 1897 Laurier's policy
was to discourage the revival of the tariff question. Tarte's
offence was partly that he did not realize that sleeping dogs should
be allowed to lie. "It is not good politics to try to force the hand
of the government," wrote Laurier to Tarte. And he added: "The
question of the tariff is in good shape if no one seeks to force the
issue." With Tarte's ejection there followed nearly eight years
during which real tariff discussion was taboo. Then under the
pressure of the rising western resentment against the tariff
burdens, the government turned to reciprocity as a means by which
they could placate the farmers without disturbing or alarming the
manufacturers. By what seemed extraordinary good luck the United
States president, Republican in politics, was by reason of domestic
political developments, in favor of a reciprocal trade agreement. It
seemed as though the Laurier government as by a miracle would renew
its youth and vigor; but the situation, temporarily favorable, was
so fumbled that it ended not in triumph but in defeat.


The disasters of the Laurier railway policy--or rather lack of
policy--must always weigh heavily against the undoubted achievements
of the Laurier regime. A period of marked national expansion gave
rise to all manner of railway ambitions and schemes, and Laurier
lacked the practical capacity, foresight and determination to fit
them into a general, well-thought-out, practicable scheme of
development. Again it was a case of letting the pressure of events