prodigal, or both.

Although the amendment of princes in these points can
have no effect in quieting our apprehensions for liberty on account of
the strength to be acquired to government by a Regicide peace, I allow
that the avoiding of speculative wars may possibly be an advantage,
provided I well understand what the author means by a speculative war. I
suppose he means a war grounded on speculative advantages, and not wars
founded on a just speculation of danger. Does he mean to include this
war, which we are now carrying on, amongst those speculative wars which
this Jacobin peace is to teach sovereigns to avoid hereafter? If so, it
is doing the party an important service. Does he mean that we are to
avoid such wars as that of the Grand Alliance, made on a speculation of
danger to the independence of Europe? I suspect he has a sort of
retrospective view to the American war, as a speculative war, carried on
by England upon one side and by Louis the Sixteenth on the other. As to
our share of that war, let reverence to the dead and respect to the
living prevent us from reading lessons of this kind at their expense. I
don't know how far the author may find himself at liberty to wanton on
that subject; but, for my part, I entered into a coalition which, when I
had no longer a duty relative to that business, made me think myself
bound in honor not to call it up without necessity. But if he puts
England out of the question, and reflects only on Louis the Sixteenth, I
have only to say, "Dearly has he answered it!" I will not defend him.
But all those who pushed on the Revolution by which he was deposed were
much more in fault than he was. They have murdered him, and have divided
his kingdom as a spoil; but they who are the guilty are not they who
furnish the example. They who reign through his fault are not among
those sovereigns who are likely to be taught to avoid speculative wars
by the murder of their master. I think the author will not be hardy