physical efficiency of the men is greatly impaired by malnutrition
(which cannot be cured if a tithe of the reparation demands are to be
satisfied,--the standard of life will have rather to be lowered), and
the casualties of the war have diminished the numbers of efficient
miners. The analogy of English conditions is sufficient by itself to
tell us that a pre-war level of output cannot be expected in Germany.
German authorities put the loss of output at somewhat above 30 per
cent, divided about equally between the shortening of the shift and the
other economic influences. This figure appears on general grounds to be
plausible, but I have not the knowledge to endorse or to criticize it.

The pre-war figure of 118,000,000 tons net (_i.e._ after allowing for
loss of territory and consumption at the mines) is likely to fall,
therefore, at least as low as to 100,000,000[45] tons, having regard to
the above factors. If 40,000,000 tons of this are to be exported to the
Allies, there remain 60,000,000 tons for Germany herself to meet her own
domestic consumption. Demand as well as supply will be diminished by
loss of territory, but at the most extravagant estimate this could not
be put above 29,000,000 tons.[46] Our hypothetical calculations,
therefore, leave us with post-war German domestic requirements, on the
basis of a pre-war efficiency of railways and industry, of 110,000,000
tons against an output rot exceeding 100,000,000 tons, of which
40,000,000 tons are mortgaged to the Allies.

The importance of the subject has led me into a somewhat lengthy
statistical analysis. It is evident that too much significance must not
be attached to the precise figures arrived at, which are hypothetical
and dubious.[47] But the general character of the facts presents itself
irresistibly. Allowing for the loss of territory and the loss of
efficiency, Germany cannot export coal in the near future (and will even