be dependent on her Treaty rights to purchase in Upper Silesia), if she
is to continue as an industrial nation. Every million tons she is forced
to export must be at the expense of closing down an industry. With
results to be considered later this within certain limits is _possible_.
But it is evident that Germany cannot and will not furnish the Allies
with a contribution of 40,000,000 tons annually. Those Allied Ministers,
who have told their peoples that she can, have certainly deceived them
for the sake of allaying for the moment the misgivings of the European
peoples as to the path along which they are being led.

The presence of these illusory provisions (amongst others) in the
clauses of the Treaty of Peace is especially charged with danger for
the future. The more extravagant expectations as to Reparation
receipts, by which Finance Ministers have deceived their publics, will
be heard of no more when they have served their immediate purpose of
postponing the hour of taxation and retrenchment. But the coal clauses
will not be lost sight of so easily,--for the reason that it will be
absolutely vital in the interests of France and Italy that these
countries should do everything in their power to exact their bond. As a
result of the diminished output due to German destruction in France, of
the diminished output of mines in the United Kingdom and elsewhere, and
of many secondary causes, such as the breakdown of transport and of
organization and the inefficiency of new governments, the coal position
of all Europe is nearly desperate;[48] and France and Italy, entering
the scramble with certain Treaty rights, will not lightly surrender
them.

As is generally the case in real dilemmas, the French and Italian case
will possess great force, indeed unanswerable force from a certain point
of view. The position will be truly represented as a question between