You would not deny, then, that courage and wisdom are also parts of virtue?

Most undoubtedly they are, he answered; and wisdom is the noblest of the
parts.

And they are all different from one another? I said.

Yes.

And has each of them a distinct function like the parts of the face;--the
eye, for example, is not like the ear, and has not the same functions; and
the other parts are none of them like one another, either in their
functions, or in any other way? I want to know whether the comparison
holds concerning the parts of virtue. Do they also differ from one another
in themselves and in their functions? For that is clearly what the simile
would imply.

Yes, Socrates, you are right in supposing that they differ.

Then, I said, no other part of virtue is like knowledge, or like justice,
or like courage, or like temperance, or like holiness?

No, he answered.

Well then, I said, suppose that you and I enquire into their natures. And
first, you would agree with me that justice is of the nature of a thing,
would you not? That is my opinion: would it not be yours also?

Mine also, he said.