And suppose that some one were to ask us, saying, 'O Protagoras, and you,
Socrates, what about this thing which you were calling justice, is it just
or unjust?'--and I were to answer, just: would you vote with me or against
me?

With you, he said.

Thereupon I should answer to him who asked me, that justice is of the
nature of the just: would not you?

Yes, he said.

And suppose that he went on to say: 'Well now, is there also such a thing
as holiness?'--we should answer, 'Yes,' if I am not mistaken?

Yes, he said.

Which you would also acknowledge to be a thing--should we not say so?

He assented.

'And is this a sort of thing which is of the nature of the holy, or of the
nature of the unholy?' I should be angry at his putting such a question,
and should say, 'Peace, man; nothing can be holy if holiness is not holy.'
What would you say? Would you not answer in the same way?

Certainly, he said.

And then after this suppose that he came and asked us, 'What were you
saying just now? Perhaps I may not have heard you rightly, but you seemed