to me to be saying that the parts of virtue were not the same as one
another.' I should reply, 'You certainly heard that said, but not, as you
imagine, by me; for I only asked the question; Protagoras gave the answer.'
And suppose that he turned to you and said, 'Is this true, Protagoras? and
do you maintain that one part of virtue is unlike another, and is this your
position?'--how would you answer him?

I could not help acknowledging the truth of what he said, Socrates.

Well then, Protagoras, we will assume this; and now supposing that he
proceeded to say further, 'Then holiness is not of the nature of justice,
nor justice of the nature of holiness, but of the nature of unholiness; and
holiness is of the nature of the not just, and therefore of the unjust, and
the unjust is the unholy': how shall we answer him? I should certainly
answer him on my own behalf that justice is holy, and that holiness is
just; and I would say in like manner on your behalf also, if you would
allow me, that justice is either the same with holiness, or very nearly the
same; and above all I would assert that justice is like holiness and
holiness is like justice; and I wish that you would tell me whether I may
be permitted to give this answer on your behalf, and whether you would
agree with me.

He replied, I cannot simply agree, Socrates, to the proposition that
justice is holy and that holiness is just, for there appears to me to be a
difference between them. But what matter? if you please I please; and let
us assume, if you will I, that justice is holy, and that holiness is just.

Pardon me, I replied; I do not want this 'if you wish' or 'if you will'
sort of conclusion to be proven, but I want you and me to be proven: I
mean to say that the conclusion will be best proven if there be no 'if.'