And if there were a knowledge which was able to make men immortal, without
giving them the knowledge of the way to use the immortality, neither would
there be any use in that, if we may argue from the analogy of the previous
instances?

To all this he agreed.

Then, my dear boy, I said, the knowledge which we want is one that uses as
well as makes?

True, he said.

And our desire is not to be skilful lyre-makers, or artists of that sort--
far otherwise; for with them the art which makes is one, and the art which
uses is another. Although they have to do with the same, they are divided:
for the art which makes and the art which plays on the lyre differ widely
from one another. Am I not right?

He agreed.

And clearly we do not want the art of the flute-maker; this is only another
of the same sort?

He assented.

But suppose, I said, that we were to learn the art of making speeches--
would that be the art which would make us happy?

I should say, no, rejoined Cleinias.