effect would in either case be equally a protective measure. Foreign
iron would, according to both systems, be alike excluded; for our iron
manufacturer could sell at $14, what, with the $10 premium, would thus
bring him in $24. While the price of sale being $14, foreign iron
could not obtain a market at $16.

In these two systems the principle is the same; the effect is the
same. There is but this single difference; in the first case the
expense of protection is paid by a part, in the second by the whole
of the community. I frankly confess my preference for the second
system, which I regard as more just, more economical, and more legal.
More just, because, if society wishes to give bounties to some of its
members, the whole community ought to contribute; more economical,
because it would banish many difficulties, and save the expenses of
collection; more legal, because the public would see clearly into the
operation, and know what was required of it.

But if the protective system had taken this form, would it not have
been laughable enough to hear it said: "We pay heavy taxes for the
army, the navy, the judiciary, the public works, the debt, &c. These
amount to more than 200 millions. It would therefore be desirable that
the State should take another 200 millions to relieve the poor iron
manufacturers."

This, it must certainly be perceived, by an attentive investigation,
is the result of the Sophism in question. In vain, gentlemen, are all
your efforts; you cannot give money to one without taking it from
another. If you are absolutely determined to exhaust the funds of the
taxable community, well; but, at least, do not mock them; do not tell
them, "We take from you again, in order to compensate you for what we