suffered, those great dangerous animals to escape notice, whilst you
have nets that entangle the poor fluttering silken wings of a tender
conscience.

The honorable gentleman insists much upon this circumstance of
objection,--namely, the division amongst the Dissenters. Why, Sir, the
Dissenters, by the nature of the term, are open to have a division among
themselves. They are Dissenters because they differ from the Church of
England: not that they agree among themselves. There are Presbyterians,
there are Independents,--some that do not agree to infant baptism,
others that do not agree to the baptism of adults, or any baptism. All
these are, however, tolerated under the acts of King William, and
subsequent acts; and their diversity of sentiments with one another did
not and could not furnish an argument against their toleration, when
their difference with ourselves furnished none.

But, says the honorable gentleman, if you suffer them to go on, they
will shake the fundamental principles of Christianity. Let it be
considered, that this argument goes as strongly against connivance,
which you allow, as against toleration, which you reject. The gentleman
sets out with a principle of perfect liberty, or, as he describes it,
connivance. But, for fear of dangerous opinions, you leave it in your
power to vex a man who has not held any one dangerous opinion
whatsoever. If one man is a professed atheist, another man the best
Christian, but dissents from two of the Thirty-Nine Articles, I may let
escape the atheist, because I know him to be an atheist, because I am,
perhaps, so inclined myself, and because I may connive where I think
proper; but the conscientious Dissenter, on account of his attachment to
that general religion which perhaps I hate, I shall take care to punish,
because I may punish when I think proper. Therefore, connivance being an