forth from the preceding part of the adhikara/n/a (a proceeding which,
although not plausible, yet cannot be said to be altogether
illegitimate), maintains that Bâdari's view, which is expounded first,
represents the siddhânta, while Jaimini's view, set forth subsequently,
is to be considered a mere pûrvapaksha. This, of course, is altogether
inadmissible, it being the invariable practice of the Vedânta-sûtras as
well as the Pûrva Mîmâ/m/sâ-sûtras to conclude the discussion of
contested points with the statement of that view which is to be accepted
as the authoritative one. This is so patent that /S/a@nkara feels
himself called upon to defend his deviation from the general rule
(Commentary on IV, 4, 13), without, however, bringing forward any
arguments but such as are valid only if /S/a@nkara's system itself is
already accepted.

The previous considerations leave us, I am inclined to think, no choice
but to side with Râmânuja as to the general subject-matter of the fourth
adhyâya of the Sûtras. We need not accept him as our guide in all
particular interpretations, but we must acknowledge with him that the
Sûtras of the fourth adhyâya describe the ultimate fate of one and the
same vidvân, and do not afford any basis for the distinction of a higher
and lower knowledge of Brahman in /S/a@nkara's sense.

If we have not to discriminate between a lower and a higher knowledge of
Brahman, it follows that the distinction of a lower and a higher Brahman
is likewise not valid. But this is not a point to be decided at once on
the negative evidence of the fourth adhyâya, but regarding which the
entire body of the Vedânta-sûtras has to be consulted. And intimately
connected with this investigation--in fact, one with it from a certain
point of view--is the question whether the Sûtras afford any evidence of
their author having held the doctrine of Mâyâ, the principle of