illusion, by the association with which the highest Brahman, in itself
transcending all qualities, appears as the lower Brahman or Î/s/vara.
That Râmânuja denies the distinction of the two Brahmans and the
doctrine of Mâyâ we have seen above; we shall, however, in the
subsequent investigation, pay less attention to his views and
interpretations than to the indications furnished by the Sûtras
themselves.

Placing myself at the point of view of a /S/a@nkara, I am startled at
the outset by the second Sûtra of the first adhyâya, which undertakes to
give a definition of Brahman. 'Brahman is that whence the origination
and so on (i.e. the sustentation and reabsorption) of this world
proceed.' What, we must ask, is this Sûtra meant to define?--That
Brahman, we are inclined to answer, whose cognition the first Sûtra
declares to constitute the task of the entire Vedânta; that Brahman
whose cognition is the only road to final release; that Brahman in fact
which /S/a@nkara calls the highest.--But, here we must object to
ourselves, the highest Brahman is not properly defined as that from
which the world originates. In later Vedântic writings, whose authors
were clearly conscious of the distinction of the higher absolute Brahman
and the lower Brahman related to Mâyâ or the world, we meet with
definitions of Brahman of an altogether different type. I need only
remind the reader of the current definition of Brahman as
sa/k/-/k/id-ânanda, or, to mention one individual instance, refer to the
introductory /s/lokas of the Pa/ñk/ada/s/î dilating on the sa/m/vid
svayam-prabhâ, the self-luminous principle of thought which in all time,
past or future, neither starts into being nor perishes (P.D. I, 7).
'That from which the world proceeds' can by a /S/a@nkara be accepted
only as a definition of Î/s/vara, of Brahman which by its association
with Mâyâ is enabled to project the false appearance of this world, and