souls, although they have sprung from Brahman, and constitute elements
of its nature, yet enjoy a kind of individual existence apart from it?
This question is in fact only another aspect of the Mâyâ question, but
yet requires a short separate treatment.

In the conspectus I have given it as my opinion that the Sûtras in which
the size of the individual soul is discussed can hardly be understood in
/S/a@nkara's sense, and rather seem to favour the opinion, held among
others by Râmânuja, that the soul is of minute size. We have further
seen that Sûtra 18 of the third pâda of the second adhyâya, which
describes the soul as 'j/ñ/a,' is more appropriately understood in the
sense assigned to it by Râmânuja; and, again, that the Sûtras which
treat of the soul being an agent, can be reconciled with /S/a@nkara's
views only if supplemented in a way which their text does not appear to
authorise.--We next have the important Sûtra II, 3, 43 in which the soul
is distinctly said to be a part (a/ms/a) of Brahman, and which, as we
have already noticed, can be made to fall in with /S/a@nkara's views
only if a/ms/a is explained, altogether arbitrarily, by 'a/ms/a iva,'
while Râmânuja is able to take the Sûtra as it stands.--We also have
already referred to Sûtra 50, 'âbhâsa eva /k/a,' which /S/a@nkara
interprets as setting forth the so-called pratibimbavâda according to
which the individual Self is merely a reflection of the highest Self.
But almost every Sûtra--and Sûtra 50 forms no exception--being so
obscurely expressed, that viewed by itself it admits of various, often
totally opposed, interpretations, the only safe method is to keep in
view, in the case of each ambiguous aphorism, the general drift and
spirit of the whole work, and that, as we have seen hitherto, is by no
means favourable to the pratibimba doctrine. How indeed could Sûtra 50,
if setting forth that latter doctrine, be reconciled with Sûtra 43,
which says distinctly that the soul is a part of Brahman? For that 43