the circumstance mentioned) on the ground of the 'permanent abiding or
abode.' By this 'permanent abiding' /S/a@nkara understands the Lord's
abiding as, i.e. existing as--or in the condition of--the individual
soul, and thus sees in the Sûtra an enunciation of his own view that the
individual soul is nothing but the highest Self, 'avik/ri/ta/h/
parame/s/varo jîvo nânya/h/.' Râmânuja on the other hand, likewise
accepting Kâ/saak/ri/tsna's opinion as the siddhânta view, explains
'avasthiti' as the Lord's permanent abiding within the individual soul,
as described in the antaryâmin-brâhma/n/a.--We can hardly maintain that
the term 'avasthiti' cannot have the meaning ascribed to it by
Sa@/n/kara, viz. special state or condition, but so much must be urged
in favour of Râmânuja's interpretation that in the five other places
where avasthiti (or anavasthiti) is met with in the Sûtras (I, 2, 17;
II, 2, 4; II, 2, 13; II, 3, 24; III, 3, 32) it regularly means permanent
abiding or permanent abode within something.

If, now, I am shortly to sum up the results of the preceding enquiry as
to the teaching of the Sûtras, I must give it as my opinion that they do
not set forth the distinction of a higher and lower knowledge of
Brahman; that they do not acknowledge the distinction of Brahman and
Î/s/vara in /S/a@nkara's sense; that they do not hold the doctrine of
the unreality of the world; and that they do not, with /S/a@nkara,
proclaim the absolute identity of the individual and the highest Self. I
do not wish to advance for the present beyond these negative results.
Upon Râmânuja's mode of interpretation--although I accept it without
reserve in some important details--I look on the whole as more useful in
providing us with a powerful means of criticising /S/a@nkara's
explanations than in guiding us throughout to the right understanding of
the text. The author of the Sûtras may have held views about the nature
of Brahman, the world, and the soul differing from those of /S/a@nkara,