and yet not agreeing in all points with those of Râmânuja. If, however,
the negative conclusions stated above should be well founded, it would
follow even from them that the system of Bâdarâya/n/a had greater
affinities with that of the Bhâgavatas and Râmanuja than with the one of
which the /S/a@nkara-bhâshya is the classical exponent.

It appears from the above review of the teaching of the Sûtras that only
a comparatively very small proportion of them contribute matter enabling
us to form a judgment as to the nature of the philosophical doctrine
advocated by Bâdarâya/n/a. The reason of this is that the greater part
of the work is taken up with matters which, according to /S/a@nkara's
terminology, form part of the so-called lower knowledge, and throw no
light upon philosophical questions in the stricter sense of the word.
This circumstance is not without significance. In later works belonging
to /S/a@nkara's school in which the distinction of a higher and lower
vidyâ is clearly recognised, the topics constituting the latter are
treated with great shortness; and rightly so, for they are unable to
accomplish the highest aim of man, i.e. final release. When we
therefore, on the other hand, find that the subjects of the so-called
lower vidyâ are treated very fully in the Vedânta-sûtras, when we
observe, for instance, the almost tedious length to which the
investigation of the unity of vidyâs (most of which are so-called
sagu/n/a, i.e. lower vidyâs) is carried in the third adhyâya, or the
fact of almost the whole fourth adhyâya being devoted to the ultimate
fate of the possessor of the lower vidyâ; we certainly feel ourselves
confirmed in our conclusion that what /S/a@nkara looked upon as
comparatively unimportant formed in Bâdarâya/n/a's opinion part of that
knowledge higher than which there is none, and which therefore is
entitled to the fullest and most detailed exposition.