from the act of killing. For the peculiar function of the particle 'not'
is to intimate the idea of the non-existence of that with which it is
connected, and the conception of the non-existence (of something to be
done) is the cause of the state of passivity. (Nor can it be objected
that, as soon as that momentary idea has passed away, the state of
passivity will again make room for activity; for) that idea itself
passes away (only after having completely destroyed the natural impulse
prompting to the murder of a Brâhma/n/a, &c., just as a fire is
extinguished only after having completely consumed its fuel). Hence we
are of opinion that the aim of prohibitory passages, such as 'a
Brâhma/n/a is not to be killed,' is a merely passive state, consisting
in the abstinence from some possible action; excepting some special
cases, such as the so-called Prajâpati-vow, &c.[85] Hence the charge of
want of purpose is to be considered as referring (not to the
Vedânta-passages, but only) to such statements about existent things as
are of the nature of legends and the like, and do not serve any purpose
of man.

The allegation that a mere statement about an actually existent thing
not connected with an injunction of something to be done, is purposeless
(as, for instance, the statement that the earth contains seven dvîpas)
has already been refuted on the ground that a purpose is seen to exist
in some such statements, as, for instance, 'this is not a snake, but a
rope.'--But how about the objection raised above that the information
about Brahman cannot be held to have a purpose in the same way as the
statement about a rope has one, because a man even after having heard
about Brahman continues to belong to this transmigratory world?--We
reply as follows: It is impossible to show that a man who has once
understood Brahman to be the Self, belongs to the transmigratory world
in the same sense as he did before, because that would be contrary to