(undifferenced) intelligence it is quite impossible to ascribe either
all-knowingness or limited knowledge; the pradhâna, on the other hand,
because consisting of the three gu/n/as, comprises also in its pradhâna
state the element of Goodness which is the cause of all-knowingness. The
Vedânta-passages therefore in a derived (figurative) sense ascribe
all-knowingness to the pradhâna, although it is in itself
non-intelligent. Moreover you (the Vedântin) also who assume an
all-knowing Brahman can ascribe to it all-knowingness in so far only as
that term means capacity for all knowledge. For Brahman cannot always be
actually engaged in the cognition of everything; for from this there
would follow the absolute permanency of his cognition, and this would
involve a want of independence on Brahman's part with regard to the
activity of knowing. And if you should propose to consider Brahman's
cognition as non-permanent it would follow that with the cessation of
the cognition Brahman itself would cease. Therefore all-knowingness is
possible only in the sense of capacity for all knowledge. Moreover you
assume that previously to the origination of the world Brahman is
without any instruments of action. But without the body, the senses, &c.
which are the instruments of knowledge, cognition cannot take place in
any being. And further it must be noted that the pradhâna, as consisting
of various elements, is capable of undergoing modifications, and may
therefore act as a (material) cause like clay and other substances;
while the uncompounded homogeneous Brahman is unable to do so.

To these conclusions he (Vyâsa) replies in the following Sûtra.

5. On account of seeing (i.e. thinking being attributed in the
Upanishads to the cause of the world; the pradhâna) is not (to be
identified with the cause indicated by the Upanishads; for) it is not
founded on Scripture.