discussed.

From all this we seem entitled to draw the following conclusions. The
Vedic passages discussed in the three first pâdas of the Vedánta-sûtras
comprise all the doubtful--or at any rate all the more important
doubtful--passages from the Chândogya Upanishad. These passages are
arranged in the order in which the text of the Upanishad exhibits them.
Passages from other Upanishads are discussed as opportunities offer,
there being always a special reason why a certain Chândogya passage is
followed by a certain passage from some other Upanishad. Those reasons
can be assigned with sufficient certainty in a number of cases although
not in all, and from among those passages whose introduction cannot be
satisfactorily accounted for some are eliminated by our following the
subdivision of the Sûtras into adhikara/n/as adopted by Râmânuja, a
subdivision countenanced by the external form of the Sûtras.

The fourth pâda of the first adhyâya has to be taken by itself. It is
directed specially and avowedly against Sâ@nkhya-interpretations of
Scripture, not only in its earlier part which discusses isolated
passages, but also--as is brought out much more clearly in the
/S/rî-bhâshya than by /S/a@nkara--in its latter part which takes a
general survey of the entire scriptural evidence for Brahman being the
material as well as the operative cause of the world.

Deussen (p. 221) thinks that the selection made by the Sûtrakâra of
Vedic passages setting forth the nature of Brahman is not in all cases
an altogether happy one. But this reproach rests on the assumption that
the passages referred to in the first adhyâya were chosen for the
purpose of throwing light on what Brahman is, and this assumption can
hardly be upheld. The Vedânta-sûtras as well as the Pûrvâ