to no doubt whatever. It closely follows the wording of the text and
does not necessitate any forced supplementation. The 'tu' of the Sûtra
which, according to /S/a@nkara, is meant to discard the pûrvapaksha,
serves on Râmânuja's view to set aside a previously-raised objection; an
altogether legitimate assumption.

Of the three remaining Sûtras of the adhikara/n/a (30-32), 30 explains,
according to /S/a@nkara, that the soul may be called a/n/u, since, as
long as it exists in the sa/m/sâra condition, it is connected with the
buddhi. According to Râmânuja the Sûtra teaches that the soul may be
called vij/ñ/âna because the latter constitutes its essential quality as
long as it exists.--Sûtra 31 intimates, according to /S/a@nkara, that in
the states of deep sleep, and so on, the soul is potentially connected
with the buddhi, while in the waking state that connexion becomes
actually manifest. The same Sûtra, according to Râmânuja, teaches that
j/ñ/ât/ri/tva is properly said to constitute the soul's essential
nature, although it is actually manifested in some states of the soul
only.--In Sûtra 32, finally, /S/a@nkara sees a statement of the doctrine
that, unless the soul had the buddhi for its limiting adjunct, it would
either be permanently cognizing or permanently non-cognizing; while,
according to Râmânuja, the Sûtra means that the soul would either be
permanently cognizing or permanently non-cognizing, if it were pure
knowledge and all-pervading (instead of being /jñ/ât/ri/ and a/n/u, as
it is in reality).--The three Sûtras can be made to fit in with either
interpretation, although it must be noted that none of them explicitly
refers to the soul's connexion with the buddhi.

Adhik. XIV and XV (33-39; 40) refer to the kart/ri/tva of the jîva, i.e.
the question whether the soul is an agent. Sûtras 33-39 clearly say that
it is such. But as, according to /S/a@nkara's system, this cannot be the