vidyâs whose object is the qualified Brahman; for the knowledge of the
non-qualified Brahman, which is of an absolutely uniform nature, can of
course be one only wherever it is set forth. But things lie differently
in those cases where the object of knowledge is the sagu/n/am brahma or
some outward manifestation of Brahman; for the qualities as well as
manifestations of Brahman are many. Anticipating the subject of a later
adhikara/n/a, we may take for an example the so-called /S/â/nd/ilyavidyâ
which is met with in Ch. Up. III, 14, again--in an abridged form--in
B/ri/. Up. V, 6, and, moreover, in the tenth book of the
/S/atapathabráhma/n/a (X, 6, 3). The three passages enjoin a meditation
on Brahman as possessing certain attributes, some of which are specified
in all the three texts (as, for instance, manomayatva, bhârûpatva),
while others are peculiar to each separate passage (prâ/n/a/s/arîratva
and satyasa/m/kalpatva, for instance, being mentioned in the Chândogya
Upanishad and /S/atapatha-brâhma/n/a, but not in the B/ri/hadâra/n/yaka
Upanishad, which, on its part, specifies sarvava/s/itva, not referred to
in the two other texts). Here, then, there is room for a doubt whether
the three passages refer to one object of knowledge or not. To the
devout Vedântin the question is not a purely theoretical one, but of
immediate practical interest. For if the three texts are to be held
apart, there are three different meditations to be gone through; if, on
the other hand, the vidyâ is one only, all the different qualities of
Brahman mentioned in the three passages have to be combined into one
meditation.--The decision is here, as in all similar cases, in favour of
the latter alternative. A careful examination of the three passages
shows that the object of meditation is one only; hence the meditation
also is one only, comprehending all the attributes mentioned in the
three texts.

Adhik. III (6-8) discusses the case of vidyâs being really separate,