although apparently identical. The examples selected are the
udgîthavidyâs of the Chândogya Upanishad (I, 1-3) and the
B/ri/hadâra/n/yaka Upanishad (I, 3), which, although showing certain
similarities--such as bearing the same name and the udgîtha being in
both identified with prâ/n/a--yet are to be held apart, because the
subject of the Chândogya vidyâ is not the whole udgîtha but only the
sacred syllabic Om, while the B/ri/hadâra/n/yaka Upanishad represents
the whole udgîtha as the object of meditation.

Sûtra 9 constitutes in /S/a@nkara's view a new adhikara/n/a (IV),
proving that in the passage, 'Let a man meditate' (Ch. Up. I, 1, 1), the
O/m/kâra and the udgîtha stand in the relation of one specifying the
other, the meaning being, 'Let a man meditate on that O/m/kâra which,'
&c.--According to Râmânuja's interpretation, which seems to fall in more
satisfactorily with the form and the wording of the Sûtra, the latter
merely furnishes an additional argument for the conclusion arrived at in
the preceding adhikara/n/a.--Adhik. V (10) determines the unity of the
so-called prâ/n/a-vidyâs and the consequent comprehension of the
different qualities of the prâ/n/a, which are mentioned in the different
texts, within one meditation.

Adhik. VI comprises, according to /S/a@nkara, the Sûtras 11-13. The
point to be settled is whether in all the meditations on Brahman all its
qualities are to be included or only those mentioned in the special
vidyâ. The decision is that the essential and unalterable attributes of
Brahman, such as bliss and knowledge, are to be taken into account
everywhere, while those which admit of a more or less (as, for instance,
the attribute of having joy for its head, mentioned in the Taitt. Up.)
are confined to special meditations.--Adhik. VII (14, 15), according to
/S/a@nkara, aims at proving that the object of Ka/th/a. Up. III, 10, 11