He who studies logic in the proper way is not filling his mind with
useless facts; he is simply turning the light upon his own thinking
mind, and realizing more clearly what he has always done rather blindly
and blunderingly. He may completely forget the

"Barbara, Celarent, Darii, Ferioque prioris,"

and he may be quite unable to give an account of the moods and figures
of the syllogism; but he cannot lose the critical habit if he once has
acquired it, and he cannot but be on his guard against himself as well
as against others.

There is a keen pleasure in gaining such insight. It gives a feeling
of freedom and power, and rids one of that horrid sense that, although
this or that bit of reasoning is certainly bad, it is impossible to
tell just what is the matter with it. And as for its practical
utility, if it is desirable to get rid of prejudice and confusion, and
to possess a clear and reasonable mind, then anything that makes for
this must be of value.

Of the desirability that all who can afford the luxury of a liberal
education should do some serious reading in ethics, it seems hardly
necessary to speak. The deficiencies of the ethics of the unreflective
have already been touched upon in Chapter XVIII.

But I cannot forbear dwelling upon it again. What thoughtful man is
not struck with the variety of ethical standards which obtain in the
same community? The clergyman who has a strong sense of responsibility
for the welfare of his flock is sometimes accused of not sufficiently