realizing the importance of a frank expression of the whole truth about
things; the man of science, whose duty it seems to be to peer into the
mysteries of the universe, and to tell what he sees or what he guesses,
is accused of an indifference to the effect which his utterances may
have upon the less enlightened who hear him speak; many criticise the
lawyer for a devotion to the interests of his client which is at times
in doubtful harmony with the interests of justice in the larger sense;
in the business world commercial integrity is exalted, and lapses from
the ethical code which do not assail this cardinal virtue are not
always regarded with equal seriousness.

It is as though men elected to worship at the shrine of a particular
saint, and were inclined to overlook the claims of others. For all
this there is, of course, a reason; such things are never to be looked
upon as mere accident. But this does not mean that these more or less
conflicting standards are all to be accepted as satisfactory and as
ultimate. It is inevitable that those who study ethics seriously, who
really reflect upon ethical problems, should sometimes criticise the
judgments of their fellow-men rather unfavorably.

Of such independent criticism many persons have a strong distrust. I
am reminded here of an eminent mathematician who maintained that the
study of ethics has a tendency to distort the student's judgments as to
what is right and what is wrong. He had observed that there is apt to
be some divergence of opinion between those who think seriously upon
morals and those who do not, and he gave the preference to the
unthinking majority.

Now, there is undoubtedly danger that the independent thinker may be
betrayed into eccentricities of opinion which are unjustifiable and are