be indeed the fact, it cannot be held to be astonishing that disaster
should have overtaken a fleet manoeuvred by a _soldier_! I recollect
that Mr. Purvis also informed me that the boilers of two or three of
the vessels (instancing the destroyed _Chao-Yung_) were worn-out and
unfit for service. Laxity of discipline, too, seems to have resulted
in disobedience or disregard of orders. As an instance of this, it is
alleged that instructions telegraphed from the conning-tower of the
flagship were varied or suppressed by the officer at the telegraph,
and that a subsequent comparison of notes with the engineer afforded
proof of this.

I was forcibly struck by the comparatively unimportant part played in
this action by that "dark horse" of modern naval warfare, the dreaded
and much-discussed torpedo. Both squadrons had several torpedo-boats
present, though, as I have shown, those on the Chinese side did not
enter the action until it had been proceeding more than an hour. The
Japanese allege that they did not use the torpedo at all during the
action, and however this may be, there is nothing to show that the
weapon made on either side a single effective hit. I drew the
impression from what I saw, that it would be apt to be ineffectual as
used by one ship against another, an antagonist in the evolutions of
the combat, as the prospect of hitting, unless the ships were very
close together, would be small. The specially-built boat, running
close in, and making sure of the mark, would of course be dangerous,
although the storm of shot from the quick-firing guns ought even in
that case to be a tolerably adequate protection. The torpedo
undoubtedly was not given a fair chance at the battle of Yalu, but the
result seems to indicate that its terrors have been overrated, that
artillery must still be reckoned the backbone of naval warfare.
Probably the torpedo will turn out to be most effective in surprise