close quarters. Sir George White knows best the part that he is expected
to play in the general strategy of this campaign, and there may be
reasons for not forcing the Boers to abandon any of their positions
round Ladysmith until the time ripens for a decisive action. It is
impossible, however, to ignore the effect that this produces on the
temper of soldiers, who say with characteristic energy of expression
that they would rather a hundred times take their chances with death in
a fair fight than remain idle under a shell fire that is trying to the
strongest nerves, though it does little material harm. Sir George is
naturally reluctant to sacrifice valuable lives in capturing positions
which we have not men enough to hold, but it would be something gained
if we could attack one point at a time, seize the Boer gun there, and
put it permanently out of action. Instead of that, we have allowed our
adversary to increase the number of artillery works and rifle sangars,
girding us about until his grip is so strong that even cavalry scouts
cannot push five miles from camp in any direction without having to run
the gauntlet of shells or Maxim bullets.

There are three positions which we might have held, or at least
prevented the enemy from occupying, and thereby frustrated all attempts
for at least a week longer, so that our communications southward would
have remained open until ample supplies of war material of various
kinds, much needed here, and especially appliances for long-distance
signalling or wireless telegraphy, could be brought up. But the time for
that went by while we were engaged in preparing positions for the
passive defence of Ladysmith, and the Boers, with the "slimness" that
has always characterised them in such operations, slipped round our
flank to cut us off from railway or telegraphic communication with lower
Natal. Even the guns of H.M.S. _Powerful_, on which we rely for keeping
down the enemy's long-range fire, did not get their full supply of