ammunition before the line was closed, and if any signalling appliances
more far-reaching than those ordinarily in use with a field force were
applied for in accordance with Captain Lambton's suggestion, they never
came.

As events have turned out, this was the gravest mischance of all, since
the next step which our wily enemies took was to close every means of
egress from this camp by placing their lighter artillery or mounted
riflemen on kopjes whence all open ground over which troops might move
could be swept by cross-fire. In other words, they took all the rough
eminences of the outer ranges best adapted for their own tactics, and
left the bare, shelterless plains or ridges to us. So far, therefore,
Boer cunning has proved itself more than a match for Staff-College
strategy, and nothing can restore the balance now but a strong blow
struck quickly and surely from our side. Against that the Boers are
naturally weak in proportion to the thinness of their investing line,
which stretches round a perimeter of nearly twenty miles; but on the
other hand, their greater mobility, owing to the fact that every
rifleman is mounted, gives them a surprising power of rapid
concentration on any point that happens to be threatened. This is a
factor that will have to be reckoned with in European warfare of the
future, if I mistake not the meaning of lessons we are learning here.
Nevertheless we might harass our enemies, giving them little rest day or
night. Here, however, the ammunition difficulty comes in again. We have
enough to last through a siege, but none to waste on doubtful
enterprises. This reduces us to the contemplation of night attacks, and
to trust in no weapon but the bayonet for capturing guns in positions
which we have not men enough to hold.

Tommy is ready and eager to try conclusions with the enemy on these