the same of another proposition--that not life, but a good life, is to be
chiefly valued?

CRITO: Yes, that also remains unshaken.

SOCRATES: And a good life is equivalent to a just and honorable one--that
holds also?

CRITO: Yes, it does.

SOCRATES: From these premisses I proceed to argue the question whether I
ought or ought not to try and escape without the consent of the Athenians:
and if I am clearly right in escaping, then I will make the attempt; but if
not, I will abstain. The other considerations which you mention, of money
and loss of character and the duty of educating one's children, are, I
fear, only the doctrines of the multitude, who would be as ready to restore
people to life, if they were able, as they are to put them to death--and
with as little reason. But now, since the argument has thus far prevailed,
the only question which remains to be considered is, whether we shall do
rightly either in escaping or in suffering others to aid in our escape and
paying them in money and thanks, or whether in reality we shall not do
rightly; and if the latter, then death or any other calamity which may
ensue on my remaining here must not be allowed to enter into the
calculation.

CRITO: I think that you are right, Socrates; how then shall we proceed?

SOCRATES: Let us consider the matter together, and do you either refute me
if you can, and I will be convinced; or else cease, my dear friend, from
repeating to me that I ought to escape against the wishes of the Athenians: