routed the Dutch by breaking their line, and that he did it
intentionally. But this movement is only mentioned in a hasty letter
to the press written immediately after the battle. If the enemy's line
was actually cut, it must have been an accident or a mere instance of
the time-honoured practice of trying to concentrate on or 'overcharge'
a part of the enemy's fleet. Coventry in his official despatch to
Monck, who was ashore in charge of the admiralty, says nothing of it,
nor does Hoste, while the duke himself tells us the object of his
movement was merely to have 'a bout with Opdam.' Granville Penn was
naturally inclined to credit the statement in the Newsletter because
he believed the action was fought under Fighting Instructions which
contained an article about dividing the enemy's fleet. But even if
this article had been in force at the time--and we now know that it
was not--it would still have been inapplicable, for it was only
designed in view of an attack from leeward, a most important point
which modern writers appear unaccountably to have overlooked.[5]

But although we can no longer receive this questionable movement of
the Duke of York as an instance of 'breaking the line' in the modern
sense, it is certain that the English manoeuvres in this action were
more scientific and elaborate than ever before--so much so indeed that
a reaction set in, and it is this reaction which gave rise to the idea
in later times that the order in line ahead had not been used in
Commonwealth or Restoration times. We gather that in spite of the
victory there was a widespread conviction that it ought to have been
more decisive. It was felt that there had been perhaps too much
manoeuvring and not enough hard fighting. In the end the Duke of York
and Sandwich were both tenderly relieved of their command, and
superseded by Monck. He and Rupert then became joint admirals for the
ensuing campaign. They had the reputation of being two of the hardest