fighters alive, and both were convinced of their power of sweeping the
Dutch from the sea by sheer hard hitting, a belief which so far at
least as Monck was concerned the country enthusiastically shared. The
spirit in which the two soldier-admirals put to sea in May 1666 we see
reflected in the hitherto unknown 'Additional Instructions for
Fighting' given below. For the knowledge of these remarkable orders,
which go far to solve the mystery that has clouded the subject, we are
again indebted to Lord Dartmouth. They are entered like the others in
Sir Edward Spragge's 'Sea Book.' They bear no date, but as they are
signed 'Rupert' and addressed to 'Sir Edward Spragge, Knt.,
Vice-Admiral of the Blue,' we can with certainty fix them to this
time. For we know that Spragge sailed in Rupert's squadron, and on
the fourth day of the famous June battle was raised to the rank here
given him in place of Sir William Berkley, who had been killed in the
first day's action.[6] What share Monck had in the orders we cannot
tell, but Rupert, being only joint admiral with him, could hardly have
taken the step without his concurrence, and the probability is that
Rupert, who had been detached on special service, was issuing a
general fleet order to his own squadron which may have been
communicated to the rest of the fleet before he rejoined. It must at
any rate have been after he rejoined, for it was not till then that
Spragge received his promotion. Both Monck and Rupert must therefore
receive the credit of foreseeing the danger that lay in the new
system, the danger of tactical pedantry that was destined to hamper
the action of our fleets for the next half century, and of being the
first to declare, long before Anson or Hawke, and longer still before
Nelson, that line or no line, signals or no signals, 'the destruction
of the enemy is always to be made the chiefest care.'

In the light of this discovery we can at last explain the curious