Such a terrific object lesson could not be without its effects on the
great tactical question. But let us see how it looked in the eyes of a
French eye-witness, who was naturally inclined to a favourable view of
his Dutch allies. Of the second day's fight he says: 'Sur les six
heures du matin nous apperçumes la flotte des Anglais qui revenoit
dans une ordre admirable. Car ils marchent par le front comme seroit
une armée de terre, et quand ils approchent ils s'etendent et
tournent leurs bords pour combattre: parce que le front à la mer se
fait par le bord des vaisseaux': that is, of course, the English bore
down on the Dutch all together in line abreast, and then hauled their
wind into line ahead to engage. Again, in describing the danger Tromp
was in by having weathered the English fleet with his own squadron,
while the rest of the Dutch were to leeward, he says: 'J'ai déjà
dit que rien n'égale le bel ordre et la discipline des Anglais, que
jamais ligne n'a été tirée plus droite que celle que leurs
vaisseaux forment, qu'on peut être certain que lorsqu'on en
approche il les faux [_sic_] tous essuïer.' The very precision
of the English formation however, as he points out, was what saved
Tromp from destruction, because having weathered their van-ship, he
had the wind of them all and could not be enveloped. On the other
hand, he says, whenever an English ship penetrated the Dutch formation
it fared badly because the Dutch kept themselves 'redoublez'--that is,
not in a single line. As a general principle, then, he declares that
it is safer to 'entrer dans une flotte d'Angleterre que de passer
auprès' (_i.e._ stand along it), 'et bien mieux de passer
auprès d'une flotte Hollandaise que se mêler au travers, si elle
combat toujours comme elle fit pour lors.' But on the whole he
condemns the loose formation of the Dutch, and says it is really due
not to a tactical idea, but to individual captains shirking their