duty. It is clear, then, that whatever was De Ruyter's intention, the
Dutch did not fight in a true line. Later on in the same action he
says: 'Ruyter de son côté appliqua toute son industrie pour
donner une meilleure forme à sa ligne ... enfin par ce moyen nous
nous remismes sur une ligne parallèle à celle des Anglais.'
Finally, in summing up the tactical lesson of the stupendous battle,
he concludes: 'A la vérité l'ordre admirable de leur [the
English] armée doit toujours être imité, et pour moi je sais
bien que si j'étais dans le service de mer, et que je commandasse
des vaisseaux du Roi je songerois à battre les Anglois _par leur
propre manière et non par celle des Hollandoises, et de nous
autres, qui est de vouloir aborder_.' In defence of his view he
cites a military analogy, instancing a line of cavalry, which being
controlled 'avec règle' devotes itself solely to making the
opposing force give way, and keeps as close an eye on itself as on the
enemy. Supposing such a line engaged against another body of horse in
which the squadrons break their ranks and advance unevenly to the
charge, such a condition, he says, would not promise success to the
latter, and the parallel he contends is exact.[10]

From this account by an accomplished student of tactics we may deduce
three indisputable conclusions, 1. That the formation in line ahead
was aimed at the development of gun power as opposed to
boarding. 2. That it was purely English, and that, however far Dutch
tacticians had sought to imitate it, they had not yet succeeded in
forcing it on their seamen. 3. That the English certainly fought in
line, and had reached a perfection in handling the formation which
could only have been the result of constant practice in fleet tactics.

It remains to consider the precisely opposite impression we get from