communication, so that it could thereafter claim that it was not
responsible for Austria's action--a policy which would not lessen the
discreditable character of the whole business--yet the more reasonable
assumption is that the simultaneous issuance of Austria's ultimatum at
Belgrade and Germany's warning to the powers were the result of a
concerted action and had a common purpose. No court or jury, reasoning
along the ordinary inferences of human life, would question this
conclusion for a moment.

The communication for the German Foreign Office last referred to
anticipates that Servia "will refuse to comply with these demands"--why,
if they were justified?--and Germany suggests to France, England, and
Russia that if, as a result of such non-compliance, Austria has
"recourse to military measures," that "the choice of means must be left
to it."

The German Ambassadors in the three capitals were instructed

"to lay particular stress on the view that the above question
is one the settlement of which devolves solely upon
Austria-Hungary and Servia, and one which the powers should
earnestly strive to confine to the two countries concerned,"

and he added that Germany strongly desired

"that the dispute be localized, since any intervention of
another power, on account of the various alliance obligations,
would bring consequences impossible to measure."

This is one of the most significant documents in the whole