all been carefully picked out from the surrounding acres of yellow sand.
Again, he would notice that the streams which come down to the bay are
all flowing in channels admirably dug out for the purpose; and, being
led by curiosity to investigate the teleology of these various streams,
he would find that they serve to supply the water which the sea loses by
evaporation, and also, by a wonderful piece of adjustment, to furnish
fresh water to those animals and plants which thrive best in fresh
water, and yet by their combined action to carry down sufficient mineral
constituents to give that precise degree of saltness to the sea as a
whole which is required for the maintenance of pelagic life. Lastly,
continuing his investigations along this line of inquiry, he would find
that a thousand different habitats were all thoughtfully adapted to the
needs of a hundred thousand different forms of life, none of which
could survive if these habitats were reversed. Now, I think that our
imaginary inquirer would be a dull man if, as the result of all this
study, he failed to conclude that the evidence of Design furnished by
the marine bay was at least as cogent as that which he had previously
found in his study of the watch.

But there is this great difference between the two cases. Whereas by
subsequent inquiry he could ascertain as a matter of fact that the watch
was due to intelligent contrivance, he could make no such discovery with
reference to the marine bay: in the one case intelligent contrivance as
a cause is independently demonstrable, while in the other case it can
only be inferred. What, then, is the value of the inference?

If, after the studies of our imaginary teleologist had been completed,
he were introduced to the library of the Royal Society, and if he were
then to spend a year or two in making himself acquainted with the
leading results of modern science, I fancy that he would end by being