both a wiser and a sadder man. At least I am certain that in learning
more he would feel that he is understanding less--that the archaic
simplicity of his earlier explanations must give place to a matured
perplexity upon the whole subject. To begin with, he would now find that
every one of the adjustments of means to ends which excited his
admiration on the sea-coast were due to physical causes which are
perfectly well understood. The cliffs stood at the opening of the bay
because the sea in past ages had encroached upon the coast-line until
it met with these cliffs, which then opposed its further progress; the
bay was a depression in the land which happened to be there when the sea
arrived, and into which the sea consequently flowed; the successive
occurrence of rocks, shingle, and sand was due to the actions of the
waves themselves; the segregation of sea-weeds, shells, pebbles, and
different kinds of sand, was due to their different degrees of specific
gravity; the fresh-water streams ran in channels because they had
themselves been the means of excavating them; and the multitudinous
forms of life were all adapted to their several habitats simply because
the unsuited forms were not able to live in them. In all these cases,
therefore, our teleologist in the light of fuller knowledge would be
compelled to conclude at least this much--that the adaptations which he
had so greatly admired when he supposed that they were all due to
contrivance in anticipation of the existing phenomena, cease to furnish
the same evidence of intelligent design when it is found that no one of
them was prepared beforehand by any independent or external cause.

He would therefore be led to conclude that if the teleological
interpretation of the facts were to be saved at all, it could only be so
by taking a much wider view of the subject than was afforded by the
particular cases of apparent design which at first appeared so cogent.
That is to say, he would feel that he must abandon the supposition of