'observation can extend,' it does appear that the scheme, if it is a
scheme, is the product of a Mind which differs from the more highly
evolved type of human mind in that it is immensely more intellectual
without being nearly so moral. And the same thing is indicated by the
rough and indiscriminate manner in which justice is allotted--even if it
can be said to be allotted at all. When we contrast the certainty and
rigour with which any offence against 'physical law' is punished by
Nature (no matter though the sin be but one of ignorance), with the
extreme uncertainty and laxity with which she meets any offence against
'moral law,' we are constrained to feel that the system of legislation
(if we may so term it) is conspicuously different from that which would
have been devised by any intelligence which in any sense could be called
'anthropopsychic.'

The only answer to these difficulties open to the natural theologian is
that which is drawn from the constitution of the human mind. It is
argued that the fact of this mind having so large an ingredient of
morality in its constitution may be taken as proof that its originating
source is likewise of a moral character. This argument, however, appears
to me of a questionable character, seeing that, for anything we can tell
to the contrary, the moral sense may have been given to, or developed
in, man simply on account of its utility to the species--just in the
same way as teeth in the shark or poison in the snake. If so, the
occurrence of the moral sense in man would merely furnish one other
instance of the intellectual, as distinguished from the moral, nature of
God; and there seems to be in itself no reason why we should take any
other view. The mere fact that to _us_ the moral sense seems such a
great and holy thing, is doubtless (under any view) owing to its
importance to the well-being of our species. In itself, or as it appears
to other possible beings intellectual like ourselves, but existing under