unlike conditions, the moral sense of man may be regarded as of no more
significance than the social instincts of bees. More particularly may
this consideration apply to the case of a Mind existing, according to
the theological theory of things, wholly beyond the pale of anything
analogous to those social relations out of which, according to the
scientific theory of evolution, the moral sense has been developed in
ourselves[28].

The truth is that in this matter natural theologians begin by assuming
that the First Cause, if intelligent, _must_ be moral; and then they are
blinded to the strictly logical weakness of the argument whereby they
endeavour to sustain their assumption. For aught that we can tell to the
contrary, it may be quite as 'anthropomorphic' a notion to attribute
morality to God as it would be to attribute those capacities for
sensuous enjoyment with which the Greeks endowed their divinities. The
Deity may be as high above the one as the other--or rather perhaps we
may say as much external to the one as to the other. Without being
supra-moral, and still less immoral, He may be un-moral: our ideas of
morality may have no meaning as applied to Him.

But if we go thus far in one direction, I think, _per contra_, it must
in consistency be allowed that the argument from the constitution of the
human mind acquires more weight when it is shifted from the moral sense
to the religious instincts. For, on the one hand, these instincts are
not of such obvious use to the species as are those of morality; and,
on the other hand, while they are unquestionably very general, very
persistent, and very powerful, they do not appear to serve any 'end' or
'purpose' in the scheme of things, unless we accept the theory which is
given of them by those in whom they are most strongly developed. Here I
think we have an argument of legitimate force, although it does not