appropriately exercised by them without impairing the supreme authority
of Parliament as the mouthpiece of the nation. I cannot here attempt to
discuss these highly important matters in any detail. In regard to
procedure, I can only suggest that the most valuable reform would be the
institution of a series of committees each concerned with a different
department of Government. The function of these committees would be to
investigate and criticise the organisation and normal working of the
departments, not to deal with questions of broad policy; for these ought
to be dealt with in relation to national policy as a whole, and they
must, therefore, be the concern of the minister and of the Cabinet,
subject to the overriding authority of Parliament as a whole. In order
to secure that this distinction is maintained, and in order to avoid the
defects of the French committee system under which independent
_rapporteurs_ disregard and override the authority of the ministers, and
thus gravely undermine their responsibility, it would be necessary not
only that each committee should include a majority of supporters of
Government, but that the chair should be occupied by the minister or his
deputy.


DEVOLUTION

Nor can I stop to dwell upon the very important subject of the
delegation or devolution of powers by Parliament to subordinate bodies.
I will only say that devolution may be, and I think ought to be, of two
kinds, which we may define as regional and functional. To regional
bodies for large areas (which might either be directly elected or
constituted by indirect election from the local government authorities
within each area) might be allotted much of the legislative power of
Parliament in regard to private Bills, together with general control