over those public functions, such as Education and Public Health, which
are now mainly in the hands of local authorities. Of functional
devolution the most important expression would be the establishment of a
National Industrial Council and of a series of councils or boards for
various industries endowed with quasi-legislative authority; by which I
mean that they should be empowered by statute to draft proposals for
legislation of a defined kind, which would ultimately receive their
validity from Parliament, perhaps without necessarily passing through
the whole of the elaborate process by which ordinary legislation is
enacted. I believe there are many who share my conviction that a
development in this direction represents the healthiest method of
introducing a real element of industrial self-government. But for the
moment we are concerned with it as a means of relieving Parliament from
some very difficult functions which Parliament does not perform
conspicuously well, without qualifying its supreme and final authority.

One final point. If it is true, as I have argued, that the decay of the
prestige and efficiency of Parliament is due to the fact that it is
already overloaded with functions and responsibilities, it must be
obvious that to add to this burden the responsibility for controlling
the conduct of great industries, such as the railways and the mines,
would be to ensure the breakdown of our system of government, already on
the verge of dislocation. In so far as it may be necessary to undertake
on behalf of the community the ownership and conduct of any great
industrial or commercial concern, I submit that it is essential that it
should not be brought under the direct control of a ministerial
department responsible to Parliament. Yet the ultimate responsibility
for the right conduct of any such undertaking (_e.g._ the telephones,
electric supply, or forests) must, when it is assumed by the State, rest
upon Parliament. How is this ultimate responsibility to be met? Surely