is wanting; the topic is only introduced, as in the Republic, by way of
illustration. On other subjects of which they treat in common, such as the
nature and kinds of pleasure, true and false opinion, the nature of the
good, the order and relation of the sciences, the Republic is less advanced
than the Philebus, which contains, perhaps, more metaphysical truth more
obscurely expressed than any other Platonic dialogue. Here, as Plato
expressly tells us, he is 'forging weapons of another make,' i.e. new
categories and modes of conception, though 'some of the old ones might do
again.'

But if superior in thought and dialectical power, the Philebus falls very
far short of the Republic in fancy and feeling. The development of the
reason undisturbed by the emotions seems to be the ideal at which Plato
aims in his later dialogues. There is no mystic enthusiasm or rapturous
contemplation of ideas. Whether we attribute this change to the greater
feebleness of age, or to the development of the quarrel between philosophy
and poetry in Plato's own mind, or perhaps, in some degree, to a
carelessness about artistic effect, when he was absorbed in abstract ideas,
we can hardly be wrong in assuming, amid such a variety of indications,
derived from style as well as subject, that the Philebus belongs to the
later period of his life and authorship. But in this, as in all the later
writings of Plato, there are not wanting thoughts and expressions in which
he rises to his highest level.

The plan is complicated, or rather, perhaps, the want of plan renders the
progress of the dialogue difficult to follow. A few leading ideas seem to
emerge: the relation of the one and many, the four original elements, the
kinds of pleasure, the kinds of knowledge, the scale of goods. These are
only partially connected with one another. The dialogue is not rightly
entitled 'Concerning pleasure' or 'Concerning good,' but should rather be