described as treating of the relations of pleasure and knowledge, after
they have been duly analyzed, to the good. (1) The question is asked,
whether pleasure or wisdom is the chief good, or some nature higher than
either; and if the latter, how pleasure and wisdom are related to this
higher good. (2) Before we can reply with exactness, we must know the kinds
of pleasure and the kinds of knowledge. (3) But still we may affirm
generally, that the combined life of pleasure and wisdom or knowledge has
more of the character of the good than either of them when isolated. (4)
to determine which of them partakes most of the higher nature, we must know
under which of the four unities or elements they respectively fall. These
are, first, the infinite; secondly, the finite; thirdly, the union of the
two; fourthly, the cause of the union. Pleasure is of the first, wisdom or
knowledge of the third class, while reason or mind is akin to the fourth or
highest.

(5) Pleasures are of two kinds, the mixed and unmixed. Of mixed pleasures
there are three classes--(a) those in which both the pleasures and pains
are corporeal, as in eating and hunger; (b) those in which there is a pain
of the body and pleasure of the mind, as when you are hungry and are
looking forward to a feast; (c) those in which the pleasure and pain are
both mental. Of unmixed pleasures there are four kinds: those of sight,
hearing, smell, knowledge.

(6) The sciences are likewise divided into two classes, theoretical and
productive: of the latter, one part is pure, the other impure. The pure
part consists of arithmetic, mensuration, and weighing. Arts like
carpentering, which have an exact measure, are to be regarded as higher
than music, which for the most part is mere guess-work. But there is also
a higher arithmetic, and a higher mensuration, which is exclusively
theoretical; and a dialectical science, which is higher still and the