nations thereafter followed. Battles have usually been fought between
forces not very different in point of numbers and material, for the
reason that a force which knew itself to be weaker than another
would not fight unless compelled to fight; and in cases where two
forces of widely differing strength have fought, the situation has
usually been brought about directly by a superior intelligence. In
fact, one of the most frequent and important endeavors of strategy
and tactics--used triumphantly by Napoleon--has always been such
a handling of one's forces as to be superior to the enemy at the
point of contact--to "get the mostest men there the firstest," as
General Forrest is said to have expressed it.

The effect of superior-trained intelligence is greatest "at the top,"
but it can accomplish little unless a fine intelligence permeates the
whole. A fine intelligence at the top will so direct the men below,
will so select men for the various posts, and will so co-ordinate
their efforts, that the organization will resemble a veritable
organism: all the various organs fulfilling separately yet accurately
their allotted functions; all the fire-control parties, all the
gun crews, all the torpedo crews, all the engineer forces properly
organized and drilled; all the hulls of the vessels, all the guns,
all the torpedoes, all the multifarious engines, machines, and
instruments in good material condition and correctly adjusted for
use.

But it is not only in the actual battle that fine intelligence is
required; it is required long before the battle and far distant
from the scene--in the "admiralty" at home. The Japanese fleet set
out fully manned with a highly trained, enthusiastic, and confident
personnel; the Russian fleet set out manned with a poorly trained