and discouraged personnel, only too well aware of their defects.
The issue at Tsushima was decided before the respective fleets
left their respective homes--though that issue was not then known
to mortals. The battle emphasized, but did not prove, what had
been proved a hundred times before: the paramount importance of
preparedness; that _when two forces fight--the actual battle merely
secures the decision as to the relative values of two completed
machines, and their degrees of preparedness for use_.

Preparedness of material is not, of course, so important as preparedness
of personnel, because if the personnel is prepared, they will inevitably
prepare the material. And the preparedness must pervade all grades:
for while it is true that the preparedness of those in high command
is more important than the preparedness of those in minor posts,
yet there is no post so lowly that its good or its ill performance
will not be a factor in the net result. An unskilful oiler may
cause a hot bearing that will slow down a battleship, and put out
of order the column of a squadron; a signalman's mistake may throw
a fleet into confusion.

Perfect preparedness of personnel and material is essential because
events follow each other so rapidly in war that no preparation can
be made after it has begun. To fight is the most intense work a
man can do; and a war is nothing but a fight. No matter how great
or how small a war may be, no war can lose the essential qualities
of a fight, or (save in the treatment of prisoners) be more brutal or
less brutal when fought between two little savage tribes, than when
fought between two colossal groups of Christian nations, civilized to
the highest point. War is the acme of the endeavor of man. Each side
determines that it will win at all costs and at all hazards; that