to being, whatever kind of nature it may be. Hence goodness does not
limit being.

Reply Obj. 2: No being can be spoken of as evil, formally as
being, but only so far as it lacks being. Thus a man is said to be
evil, because he lacks some virtue; and an eye is said to be evil,
because it lacks the power to see well.

Reply Obj. 3: As primary matter has only potential being, so
it is only potentially good. Although, according to the Platonists,
primary matter may be said to be a non-being on account of the
privation attaching to it, nevertheless, it does participate to a
certain extent in goodness, viz. by its relation to, or aptitude for,
goodness. Consequently, to be desirable is not its property, but to
desire.

Reply Obj. 4: Mathematical entities do not subsist as
realities; because they would be in some sort good if they subsisted;
but they have only logical existence, inasmuch as they are abstracted
from motion and matter; thus they cannot have the aspect of an end,
which itself has the aspect of moving another. Nor is it repugnant
that there should be in some logical entity neither goodness nor form
of goodness; since the idea of being is prior to the idea of goodness,
as was said in the preceding article.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 5, Art. 4]

Whether Goodness Has the Aspect of a Final Cause?