Objection 1: It seems that goodness has not the aspect of a final
cause, but rather of the other causes. For, as Dionysius says (Div.
Nom. iv), "Goodness is praised as beauty." But beauty has the aspect
of a formal cause. Therefore goodness has the aspect of a formal
cause.

Obj. 2: Further, goodness is self-diffusive; for Dionysius says
(Div. Nom. iv) that goodness is that whereby all things subsist, and
are. But to be self-giving implies the aspect of an efficient cause.
Therefore goodness has the aspect of an efficient cause.

Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 31) that
"we exist because God is good." But we owe our existence to God as the
efficient cause. Therefore goodness implies the aspect of an efficient
cause.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Phys. ii) that "that is to be
considered as the end and the good of other things, for the sake of
which something is." Therefore goodness has the aspect of a final
cause.

_I answer that,_ Since goodness is that which all things desire, and
since this has the aspect of an end, it is clear that goodness implies
the aspect of an end. Nevertheless, the idea of goodness presupposes
the idea of an efficient cause, and also of a formal cause. For we see
that what is first in causing, is last in the thing caused. Fire, e.g.
heats first of all before it reproduces the form of fire; though the
heat in the fire follows from its substantial form. Now in causing,
goodness and the end come first, both of which move the agent to act;
secondly, the action of the agent moving to the form; thirdly, comes