not lessen the feeling of nervousness that filled the
international atmosphere. But the true ground of such nervousness
was the policy of the balance of power, which had split Europe
into two armed camps full of distrust of each other. The
Ambassadors of the Great Powers knew the Kaiser intimately enough
to realize what his intentions, in spite of everything, were, and
it required an untruthfulness only explicable by the psychological
effect of war to permit the suggestion of a hateful and distorted
picture of him as a tyrant seeking for the domination of the world
and for war and bloodshed."

I have translated this passage from the book because I think it is
instructive in its disclosure of uneasy self-consciousness on the part
of the author. Obviously, the Emperor made his quiet-loving Minister at
times uncomfortable. I do not doubt that the Emperor really desired
peace, just as Herr von Bethmann Hollweg tells us. Yet he not only
indulged himself in warlike talk, but was surrounded by a group of
military and naval advisers who were preaching openly that war was
inevitable, and were instructing many of the prominent intellectual
leaders in their doctrine. The Emperor may well have been in a difficult
situation. But he was playing with fire when he made such speeches to
the world as he frequently did. I believe him to have most genuinely
desired to keep the peace. But I doubt whether he was willing to pay the
price for entry on the only path along which it could have been made
secure. He was a man of many sides, with a genius for speaking winged
words as part of his equipment. He was a dangerous leader for Germany
under conditions which had already caused even a Bismarck concern. The
result was that the world took him to be the ally, not of Bethmann
Hollweg, but of Tirpitz, and what that meant we shall see when we come
to the latter's book. I can not say that I think the judgment of the