world was other than, to put the matter at its lowest, the natural and
probable result of his language, and I find nothing in the
ex-Chancellor's volume to lead me to a different conclusion.

The argument of that volume is that England should never have entered
the Entente, for that by doing so she strengthened France and Russia so
as to enable them to indulge the will for war. He assumes that there was
this will as beyond doubt. But suppose England had not entered the
Entente, what then? On Herr von Bethmann Hollweg's own showing France
and Russia would have remained too weak to entertain the hope of success
in a conflict with the Triple Alliance. Germany could, under these
circumstances, have herself compelled these Powers to an entente or even
an alliance. England would have been in such a case left in isolation in
days in which isolation had ceased to be "splendid." For great as was
her navy, it could not have been relied upon as sufficient to protect
her adequately against the combined navies of Germany, France, Russia,
and Austria, with that of Italy possibly added. It was the apprehension
occasioned by Germany's warlike policy that made it an unavoidable act
of prudence to enter into the Entente. It was our only means of making
our sea power secure and able to protect us against threats of invasions
by great Continental armies. The Emperor and his Chancellor should
therefore have thought of some other way of securing the peace than that
of trying to detach us from the Entente.

The alternative was obvious. Germany should have offered to cease to
pile up armaments, if our desire for friendly relations all round could
be so extended as to bring all the Powers belonging to both groups into
them, along with England. But the German policy of relying on superior
strength in armaments as the true guarantee of peace did not admit of
this. I am no admirer of the principle of the balance of power. I should