Wilhelmstrasse, was only one mile distant from the War Office, when it
should have been two. For he held that the exactness of demarcation of
function, which was only to be attained if strategy and tactics were
studied continuously by a specially chosen body of experts, could not be
made complete if the War Office could get too easily at the General
Staff. But what he accomplished at least gave rise to a school of exact
military thought far in advance of any that had preceded it. The fruits
of this were reaped in the war with Austria in 1866, and still more in
that with France in 1870. And when the navy was first organized this
principle was introduced into its organization, first by Stosch and then
by Caprivi. Both of these had been trained in the great Moltke's ideas,
and it was because of this that, altho soldiers, they were chosen to
model the organization of the German Navy. It is true that we have
beaten the German Navy. That was because, as Tirpitz himself admits, we
possessed, not only superior numbers, but a tradition of long standing
and a spirit in our fleet which Germany had not built up. But we shall
do well not to overlook what he has to say about the procedure of basing
strategy and tactics on exact knowledge, and careful study, especially
when such ideas as that of landing small expeditionary forces on enemy
territory by means of a naval expedition, are being considered, nor what
he says of his efforts to make this procedure real. Numbers are not
always sufficient. They are not likely to be large for a long time to
come, and the study of all possibilities and of modern conditions is
therefore more important than ever. The British Army knows this. It is
not so clear that the British Navy is equally informed about the
necessity of bearing the principle in mind.

Tirpitz never served in the army, but he was brought up under the
influence of these great soldiers. His first experience was indeed
mainly in technical matters of construction. But he never let go the