true principle of an Admiral or War Staff, and the result was that he
considered, and not wholly without reason, that he was leading the
German Navy on lines which were in the end likely to make it, when fully
developed, a more powerful instrument than the British Navy. Instead of
studying merely the lessons of the past, as we here seek them in, for
instance, the history of the Seven Years' War of more than a century and
a half ago, or in the operations of Nelson carried out a hundred years
since, he insisted that the German Navy should study systematically
modern problems, and in particular combined naval and military
operations. In England we had no War Staff for the Navy until 1911, and
our Senior Admirals disliked the idea. Consequently such staff study of
military problems has never been properly developed, the wishes of our
junior naval officers notwithstanding. In Germany the idea was regarded
as a vital one throughout by Tirpitz.

The first chapter of Tirpitz's book describes the beginnings of the
German Navy. The second deals with the Stosch period. The third is
devoted to the administration of Caprivi during the time when he was
head of the Admiralty, and extends to the period when he became
Chancellor. The fourth is devoted to construction. The fifth describes
the disastrous breaking up of the Naval Administration into Boards, to
which the author says the Emperor William II. allowed himself to be
persuaded. The sixth chapter is directed to tactical developments, a
subject in which Admiral Tirpitz himself did much. The seventh deals
with naval plans. The eighth contains a very interesting description of
how he was sent to find a naval base in Chinese waters, and how he
selected and developed, with German thoroughness, Tsingtau (Kiaochow).
The ninth chapter begins the story of the difficulties he experienced
when refused sufficient money and freedom while he was Minister of
Marine. The tenth gives a vividly written account of his visits to