line prescribed to them by the commander-in-chief, was breaking the
line, which should expose him to condign punishment; and this opinion
the Court also adopts: "The [only] messages sent to the Vice-Admiral by
the Admiral's two lieutenants were to make what sail he possibly could,
and to close the line with his division; no signal was made for him to
chase with his division, or send ships of his division to chase; without
which, _while the signal for the line of battle was flying_, and more
especially after the messages brought him, he could not, _without breach
of duty_, either have chased or sent ships to chase out of the line." It
is to be noted that the word "chase" is here used in the strictest
technical sense, not merely to exclude Lestock from diverting a ship to
some other purpose than that of the engagement, but even from shifting
her place in the general order in the view of furthering the engagement;
for the Court says again: "The Vice-Admiral could not send any ships of
his division to the relief of the _Namur_ and _Marlborough without
breaking the order of battle_, there being four ships of the Admiral's
division" (to wit, the _Dorsetshire_ and that crowd) "stationed between
the Vice-Admiral's division and the _Marlborough_, which four ships
might have gone to the assistance of the _Marlborough_."

The second in command thus had no liberty to repair either the
oversights of his superior, or the results of obvious bad conduct in
juniors; for Burrish's backwardness was observed throughout the rear.
There was a long road yet to travel to Nelson's personal action at St.
Vincent and Copenhagen, or to his judicious order at Trafalgar, "The
Second in command will, after my intentions are made known to him, have
the entire direction of his line." Even that great officer Hood, off the
Chesapeake in 1781, felt himself tied hand and foot by the union flag at
the mizzen peak,--the signal for the line. Only the commander-in-chief
could loose the bonds; either by his personal initiative alone, and