vigilant supervision, as did Hawke and Rodney, or by adding to this the
broad view of discretion in subordinates which Nelson took. Before
leaving this subject, note may be taken of a pettifogging argument
advanced by Lestock and adopted by the Court, that orders to these three
ships to press ahead would have resulted in nothing, because of the
lightness of the wind then and afterwards. True, doubtless, and known
after the fact; but who before the event could predict the uncertain
Mediterranean breeze, or how much each foot gained might contribute to
the five minutes which measure the interval between victory and defeat.
It is not by such lagging hesitations that battles are won.

It is a trivial coincidence, though it may be noted in passing, that as
it was the second astern of the commander-in-chief on whom fell the
weight of the disgrace, so it was the second astern of the commander of
the van who alone scored a distinct success, and achieved substantial
gain of professional reputation. Hawke, at first bearing down, had come
to close action with the Spanish _Neptuno_, a vessel nominally of less
force than his own ship, the _Berwick_. The _Neptuno_ was at length
driven out of her line, with a loss of some two hundred killed and
wounded. Thus left without an immediate antagonist, Hawke's attention
was attracted by another Spanish vessel, the _Poder_, of the same
nominal force as the _Neptuno_, and following her in the order; with
which four or five of the seven British ships, that should have closed
the interval between Mathews and Rowley, were carrying on a distant and
circumspect engagement, resembling in caution that of the _Dorsetshire_
and her followers. He carried the _Berwick_ close alongside the new
enemy, dismasted her, and after two hours compelled her to strike her
flag; the only vessel in either fleet that day to surrender, and then
only after a resistance as honorable to Spain as that of the
_Marlborough_ had been to Great Britain. Her commander refused to yield